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Learning from Libya, Acting in 
Syria
Caitlin Alyce Buckley
Hudson Institute
Introduction
In March 2012, the UN reported that over eight thousand people had died 
as a result of the conflict in Syria.1 As monitors and journalists have 
increasingly communicated the atrocities that have been committed in 
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have to engage peacekeeping forces in the region to aid the transition of 
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Syria—by the government of Assad against protesters—world leaders have 
felt increasingly compelled to act. Western states and NATO have been 
faced with a few questions: whether or not to intervene, how to intervene, 
and to what extent. The situation in Syria is similar to the situation in 
Libya that precipitated the NATO military intervention to create a no-fly 
zone, which was authorized by the UN Security Council on March 17, 
2011.2 Various members of the international community, particularly 
Russia and China, which both have interests at stake in Syria, have 
expressed opposition to any kind of military intervention. Russia also has 
its last major military base outside of the former Soviet Union in the Syr-
ian port of Tartus. The removal of the Assad regime could lead to the end 
of access to this facility. Russia has also been blocking sanctions against 
Syria in the UN Security Council in order to protect its oil interests and 
arms sales in Syria, which were affected in Iraq and Libya after dictators 
were overturned.3 However, Aleksandr Konovalov, President of the Mos-
cow-based Institute of Strategic Analysis, described Moscow's interest in 
Syria as based less on economic factors than political factors "because a 
new Middle East is now taking shape" following the Arab Spring protests, 
"and Russia is definitely not indifferent to how it emerges."4 Syria is Rus-
sia's last foothold in the Arab world; the removal of Assad and his Alawite 
regime will curb Russia's influence in the region.
Beyond the implications of launching an air campaign opposed by other 
members of the international community, the United States has been 
reluctant to intervene militarily in Syria because Russia has supplied 
Syria with advanced air defense systems. And, according to U.S. Central 
Command chief General James Mattis, there is belief in the United States 
that the Syrian government possesses chemical and biological weapons. 
There is also fear that the United States will be involving itself in a mess-
ier conflict than Libya.5
It is arguable that the conflict in Syria is distinct from the conflict in Libya 
and thus does not beget the same response. For example, the rebel opera-
tions in Syria have not been near the scale of the rebel operations in Libya, 
and Libya did not have sectarian divisions comparable to those in Syria. 
Additionally, besides that Syrian government's tanks and artillery have 
outmatched the rebels' rifles and homemade bombs, the Syrian regime 
controls an army that is unified and committed to forcefully suppressing 
the protests and thus cannot be compared to other states such as Tunisia 
and Libya where the militaries helped topple unpopular leaders.6, 7 
Another significant factor that differentiates the crisis in Syria from the 
former crisis in Libya is that the Syrian government continues to be 
backed by its strong and long-standing alliances with Iran and Russia.
Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria
83
World leaders have been urging Assad to order a ceasefire. Because of the 
sectarian divisions in the Arab world, Syria's alliance with Iran, and the 
absence of unanimity in the international community concerning how to 
respond, the Syrian crisis has not been equivalent to the Libyan crisis, and 
thus a direct military intervention such as a NATO-imposed no-fly zone 
has not been seriously pursued. The approach to resolving the crisis in 
Syria has been to continue pushing Assad to order a ceasefire.
The Arab Spring in Libya
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was by all accounts eccentric. His strongman 
rule of Libya lasted for forty-two years, beginning when he overthrew 
King Idris I with a group of revolutionary officers on September 1, 1969. 
In theory, Gaddafi's government was based on a system of direct democ-
racy, but in fact the people's committees that held power consisted of 
regime loyalists. And, though Libya was relevant because of its oil, the 
state was not strategically important to other countries because Gaddafi 
never sought the support of a powerful patron like Russia, China, or the 
United States, and Gaddafi upset many major powers to the extent that 
few were interested in standing up for Gaddafi.
Gaddafi started making enemies in the international community after the 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, which 
killed 270 civilians, and which the U.S. blamed on Libya. A similar bomb-
ing of a French airliner took place over Niger in 1989, killing 170 civilians. 
In response, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed sanc-
tions on Libya, including a ban on military sales, air communications, and 
certain oil equipment.8
The Security Council lifted the sanctions in 2003 when Gaddafi's regime 
took formal responsibility for the bombing, paying compensation and 
handing over the suspected attackers. Gaddafi was welcomed back to the 
international community after he promised to renounce terrorism; Libya 
was voted into the UNSC as a nonpermanent member in October 2007. 
France and the United States abstained from voting on the resolution 
because they did not want to endorse Libya's candidacy but they also did 
not want to block it.9 The U.S. representative said the U.S. sanctions on 
Libya would remain in full force because there were still serious concerns 
about Libya's "rejection of democratic norms and standards, its irrespon-
sible behavior in Africa, its history of involvement in terrorism and—most 
importantly—its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and their means 
of delivery."10
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Gaddafi lost the esteem of the international community again when the 
Arab Spring protests spread to Libya. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, called for an international investigation into 
what she referred to as "widespread and systemic attacks against the civil-
ian population [that] may amount to crimes against humanity."11
The pro-democracy rebellions in opposition to authoritarianism, which 
had been triggered across the Middle East by a single man's protest 
against his treatment by the police, spread to Libya in February 2011. 
Gaddafi fought the uprisings with an unprecedented level of violence, 
rekindling enmity in the international community.
Consistently, Gaddafi denied the gravity of the crisis and his loss of con-
trol, claiming on February 24, 2011, for example, that the protestors had 
been fueled by milk and Nescafé spiked with hallucinogenic drugs.12 And 
on February 25, Gaddafi disregarded the thousands of protestors demon-
strating—demanding better government services, denouncing corruption, 
and burning buildings—and, referring to himself in third person during a 
speech in Tripoli's Green Square, said, "the people love him."13
The severity of the situation became more apparent to the international 
community on February 26, when Gaddafi invited foreign journalists to 
the capitol. They reported seeing bread lines, sections of the city in open 
defiance, the government painting over anti-Gaddafi graffiti, snipers and 
antiaircraft guns firing at unarmed civilians, citizens afraid to talk to the 
press, and bodies being removed by security forces from streets and hos-
pitals and taken to an unknown location.14 As a result, on February 27, 
the UN Security Council passed sanctions against Gaddafi and members 
of his family, and voted to refer Gaddafi to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Concurrently, Gaddafi persisted in denying the demonstra-
tions against him, saying, "My people love me. They would die for me."15
NATO Campaign over Libya
In the first days of the uprisings, rebel forces seized control of several 
eastern oil cities. Gaddafi's forces regained control of the territories in 
March 2011 and the rebels found themselves outgunned and outnum-
bered.16 At the time, Gaddafi's air force was attacking anti-Gaddafi forces. 
Since the crisis began, air power had been Gaddafi's greatest advantage, 
allowing his forces to move ammunition and supplies along Libya's long 
coast and preventing rebels from using bases and planes they had cap-
tured in the east. On March 8, 2011, NATO sent surveillance aircraft to 
Libya and soon after, NATO began its quest for approval from the Arab 
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League to enforce a no-fly zone, to force Gaddafi's warplanes from the sky 
and remove the advantage.17 Simultaneously, Britain and France were 
pursuing a UN resolution to permit enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya.18
Discussion in the international community about a no-fly zone was 
heavily contested. The African Union (AU) had communicated a "deep 
concern" about the violence in Libya, which they acknowledged posed "a 
serious threat to peace and security in that country and in the region as a 
whole."19 The AU expressed solidarity with Libya but rejected "any for-
eign military intervention, whatever its form."20 Gaddafi "should not kill 
his people," said Sam Kutesa, the Ugandan foreign minister, "[but] ought 
to look at reforms and legitimate demands of his people. "we do not want 
foreign interference … we think that there should be an African solution to 
this."21
Where NATO and the EU take into account Russia's disapproval of mili-
tary intervention, the organizations can easily disregard the AU because it 
does not have any heft in the international community. None of the AU 
member states are on the permanent Security Council. Furthermore, con-
sidering NATOs headquarters in Brussels is about 1300 miles from Tri-
poli and AU headquarters in Addis Adaba is about 2300 miles away, from 
a geographic standpoint, NATO and Western Europe have a more sub-
stantial interest in Libya.
Initially Western countries and NATO said they would not intervene mili-
tarily without approval from regional organizations such as the Arab 
League, approval from the AU, and a clear mandate from the Security 
Council.22 However, on March 12, the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) requested the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, 
which paved the way for President Obama and the majority of the Secu-
rity Council to argue for the use of force to protect civilians in Libya.23
Division in the Security Council
On March 17, the Security Council passed resolution 1973, which autho-
rized member states to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians, 
which was diplomatic code for a call to military action. Ten states voted in 
favor and five states—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany—
abstained from voting on the resolution, which demonstrated the lack of 
support in the international community for Gaddafi's regime. The 
abstaining states expressed that they did not want to get in the way of 
adoption of the resolution, but that there were too many unanswered 
questions, such as how it would be enforced and by whom, and what the 
limits of the engagement would be.24
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Manjeev Singh Puri, India's ambassador to the UN, and Maria Luiza 
Ribeiro Viotti, Brazil's ambassador to the UN, insisted that there ought to 
be a political process to end the conflict. "We must take the greatest care 
to ensure that our actions douse the flames of conflict instead of stoking 
them," said Viotti. "We are not convinced that the use of force as provided 
for in operative paragraph 4 of the present resolution will lead to the real-
ization of our common objective—the immediate end to violence and the 
protection of civilians."25 Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong said, "There 
must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any 
party under the guise of protecting civilians."26 While Baodong's state-
ment was more direct, if it were sincere, China would have voted against 
the intervention, by abstaining, they gave tacit approval.
Despite the reservations of some critics, supporters of the resolution were 
glad it was passed. Nigerian Ambassador U. Joy Ogwu explained that the 
grave and dire situation in Libya necessitated the resolution: "The current 
state of affairs leaves an indelible imprint on the conscience and compels 
us to act."27
Losing Support
On March 12, in concert with the GCC, the Arab League requested that the 
UNSC impose a no-fly zone over Libya. However, soon after the NATO 
campaign commenced, the Arab League expressed its disapproval. On 
March 20, Amr Moussa, the Arab League Secretary General, said that he 
would call a league meeting to reconsider approval by the Arab League of 
the Western military intervention. "What is happening in Libya differs 
from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone," said Moussa. "And what we want 
is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians."28
It was clear to many at the outset that creating a no-fly zone involved tak-
ing out Libya's air defenses, including air bases, runways, and helicopter 
gunships. It also meant that Gaddafi's ground forces would be vulnerable 
to strikes if they shelled towns and that Libyan naval vessels would be 
subject to ground attacks and strikes if they were used for bombardment. 
The violence that would be involved in creating a no-fly zone was not a 
secret. That the Arab League was upset about the violence that was 
involved in the NATO intervention demonstrated a shallow understand-
ing of the action that was required to create such a zone—if not outright 
denial—and undermined the effort. The wavering support from the Arab 
League was significant because the integrity and legality of the interven-
tion was already being challenged.29
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Challenging the NATO Intervention
Even before the resolution had been approved, the legality of the inter-
vention had been put to question. The allegation was that the Security 
Council and NATO had intervened in a civil war, not genocide, and since 
Libya had not threatened its neighbors or any other country, the Security 
Council was in violation of its own charters. Critics also pointed out that 
NATO, by taking the rebel side in a civil war, had become an armed ser-
vice provider for the UN and other allies, thus straying from its core mis-
sion to protect its members' territory and population. Additionally, 
because violence was simultaneously being perpetrated in many other 
countries such as Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria—where Western powers 
were not intervening militarily—some accused the West of a double stan-
dard, and asserted that the intervention supposedly intended to protect 
dissidents was actually intended to protect oil interests.
The Arab Spring in Syria
The uprising in Syria commenced in March 2011 in the southern city of 
Daraa, where about fifteen children had been arrested and reportedly tor-
tured for writing on a wall the well-known slogan of the uprisings in Tuni-
sia and Egypt: "The people want the downfall of the regime." Citizens 
carried out a peaceful protest, demanding the release of the children. The 
protesters also called for democracy and freedom. Like in Libya, the gov-
ernment responded with violence, opening fire on protesters marching 
through the city after Friday prayers on March 18, 2011. The initial crack-
down failed to dispel the unrest, and the government has continued to 
respond to the anti-government protests with violence for over a year.30
As in Libya, the protesters in Syria have demanded that their leader step 
down. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has not only stated that he has 
had no intention of stepping down, but he has also rejected allegations 
that Syrian security forces have committed crimes against humanity. That 
being said, Assad has offered some concessions and promised reform, but 
whatever promises he has made are overshadowed by continued violence 
and as of the penning of this article, he is yet to come through on the 
promises or give any reason to believe that he will in the future. The situa-
tion in Syria had deteriorated rapidly since February 2012, with one UN 
report indicating "the death toll often exceeds 100 civilians a day, includ-
ing many women and children."31 Rami Abdel Rahman, head of the Syr-
ian Observatory for Human Rights, cited activists on the ground saying, 
"Two rockets are falling a minute on average."32 According to monitoring 
groups, crimes committed by Assad's security forces include but are not 
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limited to killings, torture, rape, and imprisonment.33 As of March 13, 
2012, the death toll from the crackdown by Assad's security forces was 
over eight thousand, according to the UN.34 "The nature and scale of 
abuses committed by Syrian forces indicate that crimes against humanity 
are likely to have been committed since March 2011," said Navi Pillay, the 
top human-rights representative in the United Nations. She also said that 
inaction by the international community had "emboldened" Syria's gov-
ernment to continue subjecting Syrian civilians to overwhelming force 
and violence.35
Libya Scenario in Syria
As previously mentioned, Syria and Libya are distinct cases. Yet, the situ-
ation in Syria is similar to the situation in Libya that precipitated the 
NATO intervention considering that the citizens have been protesting 
poverty, lack of democracy, and corruption, and their protests are being 
violently suppressed by a leader, and thus begging for a response from the 
international community to interrupt the killings of citizens.36 To demon-
strate consistency and refute allegations of operating on a double stan-
dard, the West should intervene again in the unfolding crisis in Syria.37 In 
November 2011, U.S. State Department Assistant for Near Eastern Affairs 
Jeffrey Feltman insisted that the Arab League put pressure on the Syrian 
regime. "The regime must be judged by its actions, not by its words," said 
Feltman. "The killing has continued unabated. And we urge our Arab 
partners to condemn the regime and assume a greater role in building 
international pressure, including at the UN."38 Condemnation of the Syr-
ian regime and endorsement of military intervention by the Arab League 
would not enable the UN to pass a resolution and commit NATO to 
enforcing a fly zone, but it might put more pressure on the international 
community, in particular Russia and China, to be more engaged and move 
forward with a unilateral response.
However for the time being, there is an abundance of international oppo-
sition to any kind of military intervention in Syria. In November 2011, 
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who had expressed 
approval of NATO's work for the UN in the Libyan crisis, said that NATO 
would not act in Syria. "NATO has no intention whatsoever to intervene in 
Syria. I can completely rule that out," he said.39 Micah Zenko at the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations has said that could change when the situation in 
Syria is portrayed as a major humanitarian crisis in the media; until then, 
the international community lacks a decision-forcing point to compel 
action.40
Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria
89
In February 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon tasked Kofi Annan 
with ensuring a ceasefire. Annan met with Assad soon after to discuss a 
ceasefire. Assad responded to Annan, sounding like Gaddafi, saying that 
political dialogue could not succeed in his country while "armed terrorist 
groups" are operating, which has been taken as indication that the mili-
tary operation and violence will continue.41
Kofi Annan, the UN–Arab League special envoy to Syria, said on March 8, 
2012, that he rejected any foreign intervention in Syria, and that any fur-
ther militarization of the crisis would only make the situation worse. "We 
have to be careful that we don't introduce a medicine that is worse than 
the disease," said Annan. "We don't have to go very far in the region to 
find an example of what I'm talking about." He added, "The situation in 
the country is extremely serious for the Syrian people and the region, and 
I think we should not forget the possible impact of Syria on the region if 
there is any miscalculation."42 Annan noted that the UN General Assem-
bly had published a resolution stating that any intervention should be 
Syrian led and Syrian owned.43
While Russia and China have expressed opposition to the violence in 
Syria, insisting on a ceasefire, they have steadfastly opposed foreign 
intervention because it will ultimately lead to regime change, and both 
countries have interests at stake in the current regime. Russia and China 
also both have interests at stake in the country that are threatened by 
instability. Syria is a longstanding ally of Russia, a purchaser of Russian 
arms, and home to a Russian naval base. China depends on the region for 
oil. Western diplomats cited that Russia has been using its close 
relationship with Syria to put pressure on Assad. And Russia condemned 
the violence in Syria in its own draft resolution introduced in the Security 
Council. However, Russia left out from their draft, provisions that 
Western countries declared non-negotiable so it seemed the draft was 
presented just to save face.44 The fact is China and Russia will not support 
an armed intervention.
Distinguishing the Situation in Syria from That in Libya
Though on an abstract level, the circumstances in Syria are similar to the 
circumstances in Libya that precipitated the NATO intervention, the Syr-
ian crisis should not receive the same response. The Arab League, Russia, 
China, France, and Morocco have expressed that they would not support 
military intervention in Syria and are pursuing initiation of dialogue 
between Damascus and the opposition.45, 46 Furthermore, Syria is rife 
with sectarian divisions—74 percent of the population is Sunni, and the 
significant minorities, Christians, Alawites, and non-Sunni Muslims each 
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make up about 10 percent. Smaller minorities are the Druze in the moun-
tains and the Kurds mainly in the northeast. The Druze people are 
described as an isolated community of village and mountain dwellers who 
are loyal to the country, which governs their land.47 The Kurds are an eth-
nic minority in the mountainous region of Kurdistan, which stretches 
across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Syria. The Kurds have 
often been subjected to discrimination and harassment by the Syrian gov-
ernment. Kurds are not acknowledged by the Syrian government and 
have been denied basic human rights.48 Kurds are committed to demo-
cratic reform and a smooth transition of power in Syria, and the Kurdish 
youth are actively engaged in the protests in Syria.
In the early 1900s, the Ottoman-backed Sunni majority held power in 
Syria. The fractious Alawite minority originally seized power from the 
Sunni via a military coup in the late 1966 after the birth of the Baath party 
in Syria in 1947, which strengthened the Alawites by causing significant 
fissures within the Sunni majority. In 1970, then air-force commander 
and Defense Minister General Hafez al-Assad led a bloodless military 
coup that ended the string of coups. Assad was capable of managing the 
Alawite sect and wisely built patronage networks in the Druze and Chris-
tian minorities as well as Sunni military and business elites, which facili-
tated his rise to power. The Assad regime also suppressed the religiously 
conservative Sunnis. Despite obstacles such as an insurgency against the 
state in 1976 led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, power has been con-
solidated among Syrian Alawites for over forty years.49
Though the Alawite party is historically fractious, the community is aware 
that the first indication of splintering among the Alawites in the military 
or state could lead to a Sunni-led coup and reversal of power. The Alaw-
ites are also cognizant of the role of patronage in their rise to power and 
have strategically put many Christians in key leadership posts to secure 
the support of that community, though the Alawites dominate key intelli-
gence, military, and economic leadership posts.
Given the tension that exists between sects in Syria, arming the opposi-
tion could lead to "a catastrophe even larger than the one that exists 
today," according to French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe.50 "The Syrian 
people are deeply divided, and if we give arms to a certain faction of the 
Syrian opposition, we would make a civil war among Christians, Alawites, 
Sunnis and Shiites," said Juppe. It is the divisions in the Syrian opposi-
tion that have prevented them from forming a unified force that the inter-
national community could support. President Assad belongs to the 
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Alawite sect, a small, obscure branch of Shiism. Assad has concentrated 
power in the hands of his family and other members of the Alawite sect, 
which also makes up the majority of the Syrian security forces.51
Syria and Iran
The pivotal difference between Libya and Syria is Syria's alliance with 
Russia, which has, and will continue to do everything within its power to 
prevent a military intervention. Another significant alliance is with Iran. 
Iran is a powerful state in the region that has been at odds with the United 
States since the ouster of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi during the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran suppressed a prodemocracy movement 
in 2009, has supported militant groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah, 
and has pursued a nuclear program despite orders from the UN to halt the 
program.
In mid-February 2012, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham proposed breaking 
up the Syrian-Iranian alliance.52 However, attempts to break up the alli-
ance between Syria and Iran could push Iran harder to produce a nuclear 
weapon.53, 54 U.S. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen pointed out in 
March that "attacks on Syria now could also create a 'domino effect' that 
could lead to a hot war with Iran, which considers Syria a client state." 
She said, "I worry the Syria operation may be harder because of its tie-ins 
to Iran and what will Iran do militarily."55 However, Syria could equally 
consider Iran a client state since the Assad regime enjoys acting as the 
bridge between the Shiites and the Sunnis. In general, Graham may have 
been overstating the relevance of the alliance since Iran is only capable at 
this time to support the Syrian regime with military and intelligence assis-
tance; the alliance that deserves more attention and that is more impact-
ful is the alliance between Syria and Russia.
Rather than trying to break up Syria's alliance with Iran or Russia, the 
international community should find a way to use the alliances to its 
advantage during negotiations. A resolution to the crisis where all actors 
walk away feeling that they got what they wanted would be a step toward 
building diplomatic relations between Western states and the Arab states, 
and would likely be a more sustainable solution. For example, leaders 
from Western states, Russia and Arab states could meet with the Assad 
regime in unison so everyone feels involved. The objective should be the 
defense of human rights therefore the discussion should be focused on 
developing relationships as well as sharing of information and resources.
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Iran Is Gaining Ground through the Arab Spring
Some thought the fraudulent reelection of Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in June 2009 would ignite a revolution in Iran. Tehran did 
experience violent street protests, unseen for a decade, after the votes 
were counted; however, the protests did not amount to anything compa-
rable to the Arab Spring protests. The revolt in Iran was brutally 
repressed. Compare this with Egypt's successful revolution in 2011, which 
ignited violent protests in Algeria and Yemen, and drove the king of Bahr-
ain to offer concessions and money to his citizens to deter protests.56 And 
then in 2011, Libya, like Egypt, saw its leader toppled. In this context, it is 
easy to see why Syrians have been inspired by the successful revolutions, 
and have been protesting with resilience for over a year. The instability in 
Syria has posed a threat to Iranian influence in the region, especially in 
Lebanon and Gaza as Syria is the conduit for Iran's influence in the 
region. However, the Arab Spring protests for example in Bahrain have 
provided Iran an opportunity to limit Saudi and U.S. influence.
In general the uprisings in the Arab world have threatened the United 
States' influence in the region. Despite the fact that the protests are fueled 
by the desire for democracy and more freedoms, the United States is not 
gaining allies in the region, and its influence there may be waning. While 
governments are being overturned and replaced, the United States is 
withdrawing its forces. National Post reporter Peter Goodspeed wrote, 
"The U.S. and Israel are witnessing their influence and power deteriorate 
in the Middle East as the Arab Spring robs them of old allies and shatters 
old assumptions."57 While the United States' loss is not necessarily Iran's 
gain, the United States' loosening grip of power in the region presents an 
opportunity for Iran to build partnerships and forge the groundwork for 
alliances.
While the United States might be losing influence regionally, Iran is 
gaining influence. For example, the United States toppled Iraq's Saddam 
Hussein in 2003, which benefited Iran since Tehran had sought to do the 
same thing during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. 
Without Saddam Hussein in office, Iran has been able to enhance its 
influence in Iraq and the Middle East as a whole. Since U.S. troops were 
withdrawn from Iraq at the end of 2011, Iran has been more successful in 
influencing the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. Iran has 
pitched the protests as being to their advantage. Ramin Mehmanparast, 
spokesmen for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, said at an academic 
conference in November 2011, "The fall of dictators in the Middle East 
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and Africa means a loss of a foothold for the U.S. and Israel. The 
Americans are bewildered and confused in their decisions and behavior in 
the face of regional revolutions."58
The United States and Britain responded to the threat posed by Iran's 
expanding influence with words of warning. In March 2012 at a joint news 
conference, U.S. President Obama and British Prime Minister David 
Cameron issued a stern warning to Iran. Obama said, "Tehran must 
understand that it cannot escape or evade the choice before it. Meet your 
international obligations or face the consequences. The window for solv-
ing this issue diplomatically is shrinking." Regarding the violence in Syria, 
Cameron said monitors have been sent to Syria's borders to record the 
crimes. He said, "No matter how long it takes, people should always 
remember that international law has got a long reach and a long mem-
ory."59 The United States has responded to the threat of expanding Ira-
nian influence by tightening sanctions, employing covert attacks against 
Iran, and frequently deploying a second carrier strike group to the Persian 
Gulf.60
Options for Intervention
Ivo Daalder, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, announced in November 
2011, when Assad's government had already been committing acts of vio-
lence against Syrians for close to a year, that "there has been no planning, 
no thought, and no discussion about any intervention into Syria."61 
Daalder said, "There needs to be a demonstrable need, regional support, 
and sound legal basis for action. It's those three things we need to look for 
before we even think about the possibility of action. None of them apply in 
Syria."62
The international community will not resort to militarization of the crisis 
in Syria. However, Assad's regime has resisted resolving the calamity 
through peaceful political dialogue despite urgent requests from UN Sec-
retary-General Ban Ki-moon.63 The international community must 
respond and explore options to push Assad to a ceasefire; as Anwar 
Bunni, a human-rights lawyer in Damascus, said, "[Assad's] regime will 
continue to kill if nobody stops it."64
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An Alternative Approach: Coercing a Ceasefire 
via Negotiations
The international community can coerce a ceasefire to end violence in 
Syria through negotiations with Assad's regime. For these negotiations to 
be effective, Western countries need to identify what the Syrian govern-
ment values, and apply appropriate pressure in these strategic areas such 
that Assad loses power.65 For example, Assad's clout in Syria depends on 
economic favoritism, bribery, and support from stakeholders in the capi-
tol, so economic pressure and loss of support in the capital could push 
Assad to a ceasefire.
World leaders could work to drive an economic wedge between the regime 
and stakeholders in Syria through sanctions. Sanctions slowed economic 
growth in Syria in 2011, when most U.S. exports to Syria were barred, 
assets belonging to the state security apparatus were frozen, and Euro-
pean imports of oil—making up 20 percent of the Syrian economy—were 
barred. As Syria receives more sanctions from the international commu-
nity, it should become more apparent that Assad's regime is unable to 
keep peace and maintain the economy, which could compel Assad to 
order a ceasefire.66 States would have to impose sanctions individually, 
because Russia is likely to veto any effort by the United Nations. The long 
co-opted Sunni merchants have resisted supporting the uprising in Syria 
because they have a lot to lose economically. However, if the economies of 
Sunni merchants were impacted by sanctions, they would likely be more 
willing to pressure Assad.67
An alternative approach is win-win negotiations. This approach requires 
recognizing that all the parties involved have different interests and prior-
ities, and the key would be to identify the solution that gives each party 
what it values most at the least cost to the other parties. For instance, on a 
basic level: Assad's interest is power, the oppositions' interest is democ-
racy, and the international community's interests are democracy and sta-
bility. An ideal solution would be to persuade Assad to adopt democratic 
values so that the opposition's demands were met and Assad maintained 
power. Given Iran's and Russia's friendship with Syria, Assad might be 
more easily convinced to embrace democratic values if the other two 
countries embraced them simultaneously. The likelihood of convincing 
Iran or Russia to collaborate with Western powers—much less embrace 
democratic values—is minimal, but Iranian leaders might acquiesce if 
they perceived that the international community needed their support to 
be effective, especially since Iran craves to be recognized as a regional 
power.68
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The optimistic approach is currently being pursued between diplomats 
and finance ministry officials from Arab states, the European Union, the 
United States, and others, behind closed doors under the banner "Friends 
of Syria." The purpose of the talks is to keep pressure on Assad to end the 
violence in Syria. Juppe said, "Our meeting is itself a message: the Syrian 
regime must understand that it cannot continue its repression with impu-
nity, and refuse the political transition laid out under the Annan plan and 
expected by the Syrian people."69
The downside to this approach is that it is highly unlikely that Iran and 
Syria will collaborate in any meaningful way with the United States, espe-
cially since the United States has demonstrated a lack of respect for 
human rights by supporting abusive regimes in Bahrain, Rwanda, Saudi 
Arabia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea. Furthermore, attempts 
to collaborate with Syria and Iran could be inefficient and costly. While 
Tehran and Damascus have a strong relationship, neither has had an 
interest in relations with the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, 
Syria and Iran have collaborated in the development of ballistic missiles, 
arming of Hizbollah and Hamas, and challenging the U.S. military follow-
ing the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 in fear that either country might 
become a target of the "War on Terror." Furthermore, Jubin Goodarzi, 
professor of international relations at Webster University in Geneva, 
Switzerland, wrote:
"Syria and Iran are the two parties most responsible for spoiling 
U.S.-backed peace efforts between Arabs and Israel in order to 
promote their own Arab and Islamic interests. For the United 
States, they were also the most troublesome countries during the 
U.S. intervention in Iraq because they aided, abetted or armed 
insurgents."70 
Goodarzi also pointed out that since 1979 Syria and Iran have "[thwarted] 
the regional goals of the United States, Israel and Iraq."71 However, 
according to Haytham Manna, the leader in exile of the National Coordi-
nation Body for Democratic Change in Syria (NCBDCS), Russia has 
voiced support for democratic changes in Syria and turning power of 
Syria's future over to Syrians themselves. While Russia continues to 
oppose the use of force by Assad's opponents, Abdul-Aziz al-Kheir, a 
spokesman for the NCBDCS said that Russia's position has been changing 
since February and "particularly fast over the past two weeks."72 The 
progress is slow but significant.
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To be the dominating voice at the table during negotiations or dialogue 
about a ceasefire, the international community must speak in a united 
voice, acting in defense of human rights abuses, rather than one or a few 
countries pushing their agendas forward in order to limit the influence of 
other countries in the region. The international community must also 
have a viable threat to Assad's and Ahmedinejad's power. The most pow-
erful weapon would be to remove investment in the oil sector, the reve-
nues from which both Syria's and Iran's economies rely on. Syria's 
economy has suffered from political unrest, violence, and international 
sanctions and is threatened in the long term by issues such as foreign 
trade barriers, declining oil production, and high unemployment.73 Simi-
larly, Iran's economy is burdened with an inefficient state sector, reliance 
on the oil sector, and unemployment—"underemployment among Iran's 
educated youth has convinced many to seek jobs overseas, resulting in a 
significant 'brain drain.'"74
The European Union adopted an oil embargo against Iran in January 
2012 in response to its nuclear program, and banned all new oil contracts 
with Iran. The U.S. also issued sanctions with the intention to apply polit-
ical pressure on Iran to come back to the negotiating table. On February 3, 
Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei referred to the sanctions 
as "painful and crippling" yet the sanctions have not yet provoked action. 
Iranian officials have assured the public that they will prevail in spite of 
the sanctions. Since nuclear programs are symbols of power and national 
security, it is likely Iran will accept a great extent of economic pain to 
move forward with nuclear research.75 Likewise, despite reports that 
Syria's financial reserves have been halved as a consequence of interna-
tional sanctions, and according to French Foreign Affairs Minister Alain 
Juppe, Syrian authorities "continue to actively seek alternative routes to 
get around these sanctions."76
Military Intervention
Another option is to endorse military intervention, which would upset 
many members of the international community. Currently some countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait continue to support arms being 
funneled to the opposition but the efforts are in vain. As previously men-
tioned, the Syrian military is united and committed to forcefully sup-
pressing the protests so it is highly unlikely that domestic opposition 
forces will be able to beat Assad's army.
If the West had an appetite for ground intervention and supported oppo-
sition forces, the possibility of toppling Assad and his regime is greater. 
The regime could be replaced with a democratic regime. Syria is predomi-
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nantly a Sunni state, so Sunni leadership would be well received by the 
majority of the population. However, the election of a Sunni would also 
potentially trigger severance of ties or even conflict with Iran, which is a 
Shia-majority state.77 And if the intention of military intervention is to 
defend human rights, then the leader should be a person who prioritizes 
human rights. However, as said by Russian authorities, the Syrians 
should be in control of their future, with the support of the international 
community.
Despite the opportunity costs of military intervention, the benefit of 
installing Sunni leadership would be the possibility of Syria's forging alli-
ances with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is a Sunni state, and is striv-
ing to be a leader in the Middle East. The opportunity to build a 
relationship with Turkey is a real possibility given that Turkey has been 
working to develop a relationship with Syria since before the crisis 
erupted. Turkey is one of the destinations for Syrian refugees, the others 
being Jordan and Lebanon. At the time of this penning, the Turkish gov-
ernment had built eight tent cities and one temporary housing city as 
accommodation for the incoming Syrian refugees.78 Turkey immediately 
opened its doors to thousands of Syrian refugees as soon as Assad 
unleashed violence against protesters, and Turkey has led an interna-
tional political campaign to end the atrocities.79 The toppling of Assad, 
the installation of Sunni leadership, and the development of ties with 
Sunni countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia could lead Syria to 
become a more democratic state.
Conclusion
Discussions about Assad's ouster have been increasing among opposition 
leaders within Syria as well as in the international community.80 Though 
most states in the international community oppose the violence being 
committed by Assad's regime against the opposition, the international 
community has been at an impasse. Toppling Assad is not simple because 
of the sectarian divisions in Syria, complications introduced by Syria's 
alliance with Iran, and Russia and China's opposition to military interven-
tion in Syria.
In addition, the opposition is fractious, deeply divided by sects and incon-
gruent goals. The opposition has suffered from the resignations of key 
members such as Haitham Maleh, who is respected for his work on pro-
moting human rights and democracy in Syria.81 These two factors—a glo-
bal impasse and a weakening opposition—have provided some relief to 
Assad. Nevertheless, as foreign-affairs expert Emile Hokayem, an analyst 
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at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Bahrain, has said, 
"Assad's power is steadily eroding amid a crumbling economy, diplomatic 
isolation and an insurgency now schooled in sabotage and roadside 
bombings."82
The international community should continue pressing Assad through 
dialogue to enforce a ceasefire. To gain an edge in the conversation, new 
sanctions should be communicated at the outset of the dialogue. Simulta-
neously, the international community should identify individuals from 
the opposition, such as Haitham Maleh, who could replace Assad if he 
were ousted. An acceptable replacement to Assad should have interna-
tionally recognized human-rights credentials because the Alawite com-
munity is uneasy about the emergence of new Sunni leadership, which the 
international community fears might lead to propagation of violence 
against Alawites and other groups supporting the regime; a messy transi-
tion of power could lead to an ethnic cleansing. Thus, the leadership that 
replaces Assad's regime must be able to keep peace and maintain stability 
given the sectarian divisions in Syria and the region, which is an issue that 
has not been discussed enough in the international community.
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